The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years War

The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years’ War

By D. Peter MacLeod

300 pages, 6" X 9", hardcover: $29.99

ISBN: 1-55002-265-2

Reviewed by George Larrabee

This is a handsomely printed book that I had my eye on to acquire for some time after I first noticed its gorgeous front cover dust jacket, which is graced by a full‑color painting by artist David Rickman. The art is entitled Eastern Woodland Indians, c. 1750 and shows three warriors in a village scene with a bark longhouse in the background. Each is holding a weapon of 18th century frontier warfare, a fusil, war club or tomahawk, and each is garbed in different regalia of the time.

I was able to acquire a review copy of the book came when the author appeared at the annual School of the Soldier seminar at Fort Ticonderoga in June 1999. I talked to Dr. MacLeod in person, and by July my review copy arrived in the mail. The gist of the book's thesis is to demonstrate the markedly different goals and policies of the Canadian Iroquois from their French allies during the Seven Years’ War of 1754–1760. While the Iroquois (and the other Native nations) of the league of the Seven Indian Nations of Canada were, obviously, allied to the French in the decades‑old conflict with the encroaching British, their interests were not necessarily identical.

The author deals with each individual campaign in alliance with the French that the Iroquois conducted as "parallel warfare." This meant that the warriors might depart from whatever plan the French had in mind and pursue their own separate goals and/or methods, whether the French approved or not. A large consideration in formulating these differences is that the native nations were very conscious of the need to conserve their manpower and not waste lives needlessly, a consideration to which the French were not as often as committed.

Such was the case in Baron Dieskau's lives‑wasting frontal attack, European‑style, against the entrenched Anglo‑American camp at the head of the Lac du St. Sacrement, which constituted the Battle of Lake George. While the warriors with Dieskau's army assisted in the attack, they did so only from a safer distance among the trees (their sensible Canadien militia allies did the same), letting the white‑coated regulars march forward to get blown away by the barricaded Anglo‑American cannoneers and musketmen.

Other instances involve such forays as the March 1756 assaults on Forts Bull and William on the western New York frontier. In these attacks the native warriors and the French divided into contingents going against the forts, most of the warriors approaching Fort William and all of the French attacking Fort Bull. (In this instance there were Abenakis and Nippissings accompanying the Iroquois.) The majority of the warriors were not interested in making a frontal assault on Fort Bull, nor on Fort William, but they succeeded in capturing a British convoy on its way to Fort Bull.

The ambush of the convoy was entrusted to the warriors, who "proceeded to demonstrate a higher level of discipline" than the French. As they waited in ambush, French "officers were obliged to use a degree of force to restrain their famished troops, for fear that musket shots would warn the fort of their arrival." The warriors attacked and captured nine wagons and ten teamsters (save one) without raising the war cry or firing a shot. The French and six warriors then went on to attack Fort Bull, where, in a fierce frontal assault, they succeeded in capturing the fort. However, the garrison, some 60‑odd strong, offered resistance, which inflicted casualties. In their rage over the casualties, the French killed almost everyone in the fort, perpetrating the Fort Bull Massacre.

At Fort Bull two of the assaulting warriors had been fatally wounded, just as the native fighters had feared would happen in such an open‑ground assault. The second fatality, in fact, occurred alter the attack was over from debris flung by the belated explosion of the fort's magazine. The main body of warriors, having captured the wagons and wiped out the 17‑man patrol from Fort William without loss to themselves, was not particularly impressed with the French performance at Fort Bull. "At no point did the (warriors) appear particularly impressed with French tactics or intelligence,” writes MacLeod. The French success in taking the fort with light casualties the natives attributed more to luck than to anything else.

Dr. MacLeod's book is full of such instances, including the apparent divergence between native warriors and the French at Fort William Henry in 1757, where Gen. Montcalm had pledged safe conduct to Col. Munro's garrison only to see his allied warriors fall upon the British column after they had marched out. While Montcalm had been anxious to negotiate the fort's surrender before British reinforcements could arrive, the hitherto marginalized warriors were equally anxious to obtain scalps, prisoners and plunder, not wanting to return home empty‑handed afler having come such a long way. The Wabanakiak (Abenaki) warriors in particular wanted revenge after having heard that a number of their chiefs had been murdered by the British at a peace parley. They also doubted the wisdom of turning conquered enemy troops loose, which would only release an equal number of Anglais soldiers to come against them.

Therefore the divergent interests between the French and their native allies not only put them on different paths during their mutual resistance to British expansionism, but also sometimes led them into conflict with each other. In the case of the last‑cited instance at Fort William Henry, the allies may not have been, in reality, as far apart in their policy as Montcalm's agreement with Munro made it seem, as the French also had no interest in releasing prisoners only to have them come against the French again. If Montcalm had really wanted to see the garrison safely to Fort Edward, he could have used his entire army, flying a flag of truce, to protect the column on its way to Edward. That he failed to do so, providing only an understrength and belated guard, is significant of his real intention.

In other cases, however, especially as the war progressed and French fortunes turned for the worse, the native allies gradually became "erstwhile" allies, abandoning the sinking Gallic ship and, with the principle of self‑preservation in mind, making their own accommodations with the advancing British. MacLeod goes into considerable detail on this point. For a time the Canadian Iroquois kept a foot in both camps. When victorious British troops approached a St. Lawrence River village, the headmen would declare neutrality and cooperation, while at the same time some of their warriors were still with the French forces in the shrinking territory of New France near Montreal and Quebec City. At that point it would not have been politic to ally completely with either side, as a large French fleet could arrive with reinforcements at any time (while the ice was out), reversing the fortunes of war.

But as we know, no relief‑bringing French fleet ever showed up, thanks to King Louis XIV. The French Marine had been more powerful than the British Navy in 1700, but the Sun King, in pursuing his martial ambitions on land, had neglected his fleet. He allowed it to shrink while the British fleet grew, so that by the 1750s the French Marine was hopelessly outclassed by the British (McLennan 294–295).

The Canadian Iroquois is illustrated with numerous engravings from the era of the French and Indian War, including the reproduction of extant and current maps. Some of the extant illustrations (paintings as well as engravings) are not necessarily accurate, as their captions make clear. On the other hand, the illustrations by 20th century artists very likely are accurate, as the 18th century artists and engravers back in Europe often turned out pictures while having only a vague idea of what should actually be in a given scene.

The Canadian Iroquois is a joint publication of Dundurn Press and the Canadian War Museum. It is available online and from your local bookstore.